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Order aggressiveness of different broker-types in response to monetary policy news 
Abstract: This paper examines the pattern of order aggressiveness, and the determinants 
of this pattern for institutional and retail brokers in the interval around monetary policy 
announcements. Utilizing a high-frequency dataset, with broker identifiers for each order 
submitted on the ASX over the period Dec 2007 – Dec 2014, I identify a sharp increase in the 
number of orders submissions in the period following RBA announcements.  Orders are more 
aggressive, and more abundant, when there is less information for investors to digest. On average, 
retail orders are more aggressive and are exclusively concerned with the likelihood of order 
execution. The submission decision of institutional brokers is more nuanced and evolves over 
time as market conditions change and information arrives. I also recognize differences in order 
aggressiveness attributable to firm-size and industry. 
1. Introduction 
Stock market investors face an important trade-off when entering orders into a limit order 
book. Market orders (or marketable limit orders) have the advantage of immediate order 
execution, but at the price of higher execution costs. On the other hand, limit orders present price 
improvements but have an increased risk of non-execution. This study investigates the pattern of 
order aggressiveness of institutional and retail brokers, and the factors that determine this pattern, 
in the period around monetary policy announcements by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).  
A broad literature has attempted to empirically examine this choice of order placement 
and aggression level. Biasis et al. (1995), Ranaldo (2004), Hall and Hautsch (2006), Aitken et al. 
(2007a), and Duong et al. (2009) are among those that identify a relationship between order 
aggressiveness and market depth, bid-ask spreads and volatility. Griffiths et al. (2000) find that 
aggressive orders have a large price impact but smaller opportunity costs than passive orders; such 
price impacts are amplified by order size, firm size, and market volatility. Lo and Sapp (2010) find 
that information asymmetry and liquidity play an important role in the choice of order 
aggressiveness. This study contributes to this discussion by focusing on the period around 
monetary policy announcements. The institutional setting surrounding such announcements is 
interesting to study since there is likely to be a low level of information asymmetry prior to the 
announcement. Therefore, any trading advantage, and difference in the order submission process, 
will likely arise as a result of the ability to interpret announcements, and the speed in 
implementing investment decisions. 
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Sakar and Schwartz (2009) infer motives for trade initiation on the basis of market 
sidedness, which is determined by the correlation between buy-side and sell-side trade initiations 
(an increased (decreased) correlation indicated that trading is more two-sided (one-sided)). They 
argue that trading motivated by asymmetric information generates more one-sided markets, 
whereas trading motivated by differential information / beliefs leads to more two-sided markets. 
Results suggest that more two-sided markets are observed after news releases, especially when the 
news surprises are large; such markets are generally, but not always, associated with lower order 
imbalance. 
If the same patterns are realised in the period around monetary policy announcements, 
then we may expect to see declining order submission prior to the announcement, and more two-
sided markets following the announcement. Order aggressiveness of retail traders should not 
expected be to be influenced by the presence of a monetary policy announcement, although this 
is contrary to the results reported here. The order aggressiveness expected by informed 
institutions is unclear; Aitken et al. (2007b) suggest they should be more aggressive where an 
information advantage is perceived, while Bloomfield et al. (2005) suggest a lower level of 
aggression through the use of limit orders. The empirical results presented in this paper are more 
supportive of the latter argument. 
Understanding the order submission process is important since it can provide insights into 
market efficiency, and the conditions under which liquidity is supplied and demanded by market 
participants. Additionally, been cognizant of the determinants of order submission strategies 
allows optimization, which Harris (1998) suggests will result in lower transaction costs and higher 
portfolio returns. Since macroeconomic news in general, and monetary policy news in particular, 
has a significant bearing on the stock market, it is intuitive to expect that policy news may also be 
a factor influencing the appropriate level of order aggression. It is possible that proximity to such 
news, which has a significant impact on volatility, may induce panic in investors who may then 
be less concerned with price and more concerned with execution certainty, the result being more 
aggressive orders. Alternatively, investors may be concerned with getting “picked-off” in a fast-
moving market and so make greater use of less aggressive limit orders. 
Through the use of Australian data, which has unique properties regarding the 
identification of brokers and the centralization of trading, I am able to gain an insight into this 
important process that will be applicable to monetary policy events elsewhere, and to 
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macroeconomic news more generally. Using an empirical set-up that is closest to that of Ranaldo 
(2004) and Duong et al. (2009), I find the following key results. First, there is a sharp increase in 
order submission as market participant assimilate information in the period immediately 
following RBA target rate announcement. The scale of the jump in orders dependent on both the 
magnitude and direction of the surprise component of the announcement; orders are more 
aggressive, and more prevalent, when there is less information for participants to digest (for 
instance when the target rate is predictably unchanged). Second, there is a distinction in the order 
submission choice for institutional and retail brokers. Institutional brokers are concerned with 
both the likelihood and cost of order execution. Aggression of order submission is reduced 
whenever the likelihood of execution is improved, or the cost of execution (e.g. bid-ask spreads) 
rises.  
The dynamic order submission process for institutional brokers is consistent with the 
evolving liquidity provision of Bloomfield et al. (2005), the possibility of information asymmetry, 
and the desire to avoid been “picked-off” (Foucalt, 1999). A simple experiment suggests that an 
information advantage is the most likely explanation. On the other-hand, retail brokers appear to 
be solely concerned with certainty of execution and thus are more aggressive. Third, there is a 
variation in the observed order submission pattern, and the determinants of that pattern, for 
large-cap firms on one-side and mid-cap and small-cap on the other. Similarly, there is a 
difference for financial and non-financial firms, with institutional (retail) brokers acting more 
aggressively in stocks of financial (non-financial) firms. Finally, both institutional and retail 
orders are rational to the extent that there is less willingness to buy (sell) ahead of target rate 
decisions which are expected to produce falling (rising) share prices. That is, when the rates are 
expected to increase (decrease) then buy (sell) orders are less aggressive. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the salient 
literature in this field. Section 3 discusses the data utilized in the empirical analysis, and describes 
the process by which brokers are classified, orders aggressiveness is categorized, and RBA target 
rate surprises are determined. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and Section 5 discusses the 





2. Literature Review 
Most models of trading behaviour assume a homogeneous interpretation of information. 
However, it is possible that information asymmetry may arise owing to the release of public 
information such as macroeconomic announcements or important corporate announcements (e.g. 
earnings, takeovers, or bond rating changes). Chae (2005) investigates trading volume in the 
period around corporate events and demonstrates that, consistent with decreasing volume in 
periods of high adverse selection costs, trading volume is negatively (positively) correlated with 
levels of information asymmetry before (after) scheduled announcements. This is consistent with 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) who report a higher level of market activity when opinions diverge, 
and Kandel and Pearson’s (1995) assumption that traders differ in their interpretation and this 
induces trading. Griffiths et al. (2000) find that aggressive orders are motivated by information. 
This is supported by Aitken et al. (2007b) who report that institutions are more aggressive than 
other traders in an attempt to benefit from any short-lived information advantage, while retail 
traders are less aware of the market state when placing aggressive orders. On the other hand, 
Bloomfield et al. (2005) note that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders.  
The literature has established that macroeconomic news announcements, particularly 
those related to monetary policy decisions, have a significant impact on measures of market 
activity, liquidity, and volatility. Monetary policy may affect asset prices through interest rate and 
/ or credit channels, and so announcements relating to policy decisions may be considered likely 
to impact trading decisions. U.S. markets respond to the actual (Cook and Hahn, 1989) and 
surprise (Kuttner, 2001; Fatum and Scholnick, 2008) component of the Federal Reserve as well as 
communication about future policy actions (Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005).  Bernanke and 
Kuttner (2005) seek to identify specific factors that affect the response, such as distinguishing 
between scheduled and unscheduled changes. They speculate that intermeeting moves convey 
more urgency and so have larger impact on financial markets. Fleming and Piazzesi (2005) show 
that market liquidity in the period around FOMC decisions behaves in a similar manner to that 
found for other macroeconomic announcements. 
Erenburg et al. (2006) report a large increase in trading activity immediately after 
macroeconomic announcements, with local traders reacting faster than off-exchange traders. 
Ruhl and Stein (2015) find that bid-ask spreads are significantly affected by monetary policy 
announcements with the effect strongest for announcements that comprise unexpected 
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information. The identified response is rapid; Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) and Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) analyze the impact of macroeconomic news on the U.S. interest rate and foreign 
exchange markets and report that most of the reaction is complete within the first minute of the 
news release. Frino and Hill (2001) and Smales (2013) describe similar results for Australian stock 
index futures and interest rate futures. 
The literature concerning the effect of macroeconomic news on specific types of investors 
is more limited. Nofsinger (2001) investigates the trading behaviour of both institutional and 
retail investors in the period around firm-specific and macroeconomic news releases. He identifies 
a response that is concentrated in large firms, such that investors conduct a high proportion of 
trading around news releases, with institutions responding to both good and bad news, while 
retails investors only trade in response to good news.  
It is likely that the choice of order aggressiveness evolves over time and this has 
implications for market efficiency and price formation. Bloomfield et al. (2005) find that liquidity 
provision develops as trading progresses in an experimental setting. Informed traders provide 
liquidity in response to the price adjustment to new information, taking liquidity when the value 
of their information is high, and providing liquidity when the value is low. Lebedeva (2014) notes 
an increase in trading aggressiveness after public news and examines the influence of this on the 
speed of price adjustment. She argues that an increase in trading aggressiveness may allow for 
quick price changes that are beneficial, but can also slow down the price adjustment process is 
such orders are mostly used by uninformed traders to transact on their heterogenous beliefs. In 
this case, there would be a cost to the market in terms of an increased chance of price 
overshooting and higher than necessary volatility. 
Ranaldo (2004) analyzes the information content of the limit order book for the Swiss 
stock exchange. He shows that patient traders become more aggressive when the same- (opposite-
) side book is thicker (thinner), the spread wider, and volatility increases. There is also evidence of 
order submission varying for buy and sell orders. Duong et al. (2009) are able to utilize unique 
reporting characteristics of the Australian market to identify similar results for orders identified as 
belonging to institutional and retail brokers.   
 The empirical evidence is supported by the theoretical models of Harris (1998), Parlour 
(1998), Foucalt (1999) and Handa et al. (2003) among others. Harris (1998) derives optimal order 
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submission strategies for three stylized traders. His model highlights the important relationship 
between time and price in the search for liquidity. Parlour (1998) focuses on the choice between 
demanding liquidity through the placement of market orders (or marketable limit orders) and 
supplying liquidity by submitting limit orders. Examining the costs and determinants of order 
aggressiveness, the model highlights that the decision to submit a market order or a limit order 
depends on the market depth on either side of the order book. Aggressive orders are then more 
likely to be motivated by information. Foucalt (1999) provides a game-theoretic model and 
obtains closed-form solutions for order placement strategies in equilibrium. Limit orders results in 
better execution prices but face the risk of non-execution and a winners’ curse problem (“picked-
off”). In this framework volatility is recognized as the key determinant of the choice between 
market and limit orders. Handa et al. (2003) model quote-setting in an order driving market 
where trading occurs because investors have heterogenous beliefs about valuation levels and the 
advent of news is not common knowledge. The size of the spread, and associated liquidity, is then 
a function of the differences in valuation and adverse selection. 
3. Data  
I investigate the determinants of order aggressiveness in the period surrounding RBA cash 
target rate announcements for 30 large-cap, 30 mid-cap, and 30 small-cap stocks traded on the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX); a consolidated electronic limit order book market. To avoid 
complications arising from a regime change in RBA monetary policy communication, the sample 
of policy decisions starts on 05 December 2007; from this date the RBA has issued a statement 
explaining their decision following all monetary policy meetings rather than solely those 
meetings that result in a change in the target rate. The sample period ends on 02 December 2014. 
The empirical study focuses on the period immediately surrounding each RBA announcement. 
3.1 Stock Selection and Data 
Stocks are selected on the basis of stock market capitalisation and trading activity. First, I 
consider only seasoned common stocks so that all unit trusts, preference shares, and stocks with 
less than 3-years of trading history are excluded from the sample. Second, I require that all the 
stocks under investigation must be included in the S&P/ASX 200 index on 04 December 2007 (the 
day prior to the start of the sample period) and 02 December 2014 (the end of the sample period). 
The choice of the S&P/ASX 200 index ensures the representation of large-cap, mid-cap, and 
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small-cap stocks as well as the institutional trading interest and the liquidity of the stocks 
considered. Consistent with ASX classification, large-cap stocks are defined as the stocks which 
are included in the S&P/ASX 50 index. Mid-cap stocks are defined as stocks included in the 
S&P/ASX 100 index but not in the S&P/ASX 50 index. Similarly, small-cap stocks are defined as 
those included in the S&P/ASX 200 index but not in the S&P/ASX 100 index. Third, I rank all 
large-cap, mid-cap, and small-cap stocks based on the daily average number of trades for the 
three-month period prior to the sample period. The chosen 30 large-cap stocks are the 30 most 
traded large-cap stocks, and the chosen 30 small-cap stocks are the 30 least traded small-cap 
stocks. The 30-mid cap stocks are selected as the 15 stocks directly above and below the mean 
daily average number of trades. Approximately 20% of the firms in each category are designated 
as financial (determined by the 2-digit GICS sector code). Large-cap firms exhibit more liquidity, 
so have lower non-execution risk, and are more closely monitored than mid-cap and small-cap 
firms. By examining stocks of varying firm size the generalizability of results is improved. 
Table 1, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics for the stocks considered in this study. The 
average market capitalisation of large-cap firms at $25.5 billion is over ten times greater than that 
of mid-cap firms, and 28 times greater than small-cap firms. Consistent with the literature, 
trading volume, whether measured by number of trades or value of trades, is highest for large-cap 
stocks and lowest for small-cap stocks, while the opposite is true for relative spreads.  
Order-book and market depth data are obtained from the Securities Industry Research 
Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The Order-Book dataset records details on each order, including 
the order type (order submission, order revision, order cancellation and execution), the date and 
time to the nearest hundredth of a second, instrument code, order price, order volume and order 
direction (buy or sell). Each new order is assigned a unique identification number to enable 
tracking from submission through to revision, cancellation, or execution. A unique feature of this 
dataset is the broker code identifier which allows the classification of orders as those submitted by 
institutional or retail broker-types.  
The Market Depth dataset contains information on the market depth of a particular stock. 
Specifically, it details the 10 best limit prices on the bid- and ask-side, together with the total 
volume at each price level. I remove all the observations in the dataset whenever the bid price is 
greater than the ask price at any of the 10 limit price levels. I also exclude all observations where 
the bid (ask) prices are not in strict descending (ascending) order from the first to the tenth best 
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prices. By combining the two datasets, I arrive at a final dataset containing detailed information 
on every order submitted, revised or cancelled together with the market depth information at the 
time of the order. In this study, only the orders submitted in the main trading session (from 10:10 
to 16:00) on the day of an RBA target rate decision are included. Following Duong et al. (2009), I 
exclude crossing orders, All or Nothing orders and Fill and Kill orders from the analysis. This 
paper seeks to understand the decision to enter an order into the order book given market 
conditions. As such, limit orders which are revised are treated as a new order, while orders that 
are cancelled (which frequently occur) are treated as an order at the time of initial submission but 
the subsequent cancellation is excluded from the sample. 
The focus on Australian securities offers three distinct advantages. First, I am able to 
determine the name of the broker that entered any given order into the order book and 
subsequently classify each order as emanating from a particular broker-type. Second, the ASX has 
been a consolidated order book for the vast majority of the sample period12, and there is no 
payment for order flow as in the United States. Third, with a sample period of RBA meetings over 
8 calendar years, the data set covers a sample period that is longer than those used in other 
studies. 
3.2 Broker Classification and Order Aggressiveness 
The main purpose of this study is to develop an understanding of the difference in order 
aggressiveness of order places by institutional and retail broker types. In order to undertake this 
analysis, the broker code identifiers in the data provided by SIRCA must be classified 
appropriately.  I follow the approach of Fong et al. (2014) in assigning classifications on the basis 
of brokers’ names and the description of the brokers’ activities and services provided through 
their websites, news articles, or telephone interview. The step-by-step process is detailed in 
Appendix A. 
                                                             
1 Chi-X entered the Australian market as a trading platform in November 2011 and remains the only 
competitor to the ASX. The total proportion of trading volume has remained 15% or less in the intervening 
period, as opposed to the fragmentation witnessed in other markets such as the U.S. 
2 In order to investigate the impact of the introduction of Chi-X on the reported results, the empirical 
analysis is repeated with two sub-samples: pre-November 2011 and post-November 2011. The results are 
qualitatively similar (the main difference is a small ~2% increase in the proportion of limit orders by retail 
brokers, and slightly greater use of level 5 as opposed to level 6 limit orders) and so only the results for the 
whole sample are reported in the main text of the paper. A summary of the results for the two sub-samples 
described here is available from the author upon request. 
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Order Aggressiveness for each order is assigned on the basis of the six categories identified 
in Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders are the most aggressive type, they are buy (sell) orders 
with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and the size of the order exceeds the market 
depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These bid (ask) orders are executed against the volume at the ask 
(bid) and in part against the market depth available higher (lower) in the book up to the order 
price. The unfilled portion of the order enters as a limit order in the order book. Category 2 
orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume 
than the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote. These orders are executed immediately and the 
unfilled portion of the order becomes a limit order at that price in the limit order book. Category 
3 orders are orders with price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the 
market depth at the opposite best quote. These orders are executed immediately and in full. 
Category 43 orders are limit orders within the prevailing quotes, while Category 5 orders are 
placed at the prevailing quote. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders placed below (above) the 
prevailing quote and are the least aggressive.  
Categories 1, 2 and 3 are marketable limit orders that result in immediate execution and 
are thus analogous to market orders for immediate execution at posted prices in a specialist or 
dealer market such as the New York Stock Exchange. Categories 4, 5 and 6 are limit orders, as 
they are not executed immediately. 
Descriptive statistics for order aggressiveness and related market conditions at the time of 
order submission are provided in Table 1, Panel B. The least aggressive limit orders (categories 5 
and 6) are most prevalent for both institutional and retail investors. The next most common 
orders are in category 3; such orders, which are filled in full, are generally small and submitted 
when depth on the opposite side of the quote is large. Category 2 orders have the largest order 
size which may explain why they are not filled in full. 
<Insert Table 1> 
                                                             
3 In June 2010, the ASX established Centre Point, which allows market participants to execute orders 
anonymously at the prevailing mid-point of the national best bid and offer. This may affect the classifying 
of orders as Category 4. He and Lepone (2014) note that less than 1% of total trade volume is executed 
through Centre Point, while I categorise only 1.1% (2.7%) of institutional (retail) trades as Category 4. A 
robustness test on orders when the prevailing bid-ask spread is greater than one tick produces results that 




3.3 RBA Cash Target Rate Surprise 
The overnight cash rate target is the primary monetary policy tool of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) and, following a meeting of the Reserve Bank Board, an announcement of the 
target rate decision is made at 14:30 (AEST) on the first Tuesday of each month other than 
January. Consistent with the notion of efficient markets, I would expect the order submission 
pattern to be affected only by the unexpected or surprise component of the announcement. 
Smales (2012a) augments the methodology of Kuttner (2001) to make use of the fact that the RBA 
is able to maintain the interbank overnight cash rate very close to the target, together with the 
availability of 30-day interbank futures contracts, to derive explicit ex-ante expectations on RBA 
target rate decisions. I utilise this method to calculate the RBA cash target rate surprise as: 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =  ∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝐸[∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇]                       (1.A) 
𝐸[∆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇] = 𝐸�𝑅𝑆𝑝𝑆𝑝� − 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑆 =
𝐷𝑚×𝑅𝐼𝐼−𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝×𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
        (1.B) 
Where RIB is the rate implied from the front-contract interbank future, Rpost is the RBA 
target rate post announcement, Rprior is the RBA target rate applicable immediately prior to the 
announcement, Dm is the total number of days in the month in which the announcement takes 
place, Dpre is the number of days in the month prior to the announcement date, and Dpost is the 
number of days following the announcement for which the announced target rate will be 
effective. 
 During the December 2007 – December 2014 sample period the RBA made 78 target rate 
decisions, resulting in 14 reductions in the target rate (averaging 46.4 basis points), 9 increases in 
the target rate (each of 25 basis points), and 55 occasions on which rates were left unchanged. The 
market may be surprised by decisions that result in easier (tighter) than expected policy should 
the RBA reduce (increase) the target rate by more than the expected amount, leave the rate on 
hold when a hike (cut) is expected, or increase (decrease) the rate less than expected. Owing to 
the bid-ask spread in 30-day interbank futures I denote market pricing of less than 2 basis points 
as the market having expectations of no rate move. On this basis, the market was surprised by 
easier policy on 15 occasions with an average surprise of 10.8 basis points, and by tighter policy 
on 44 occasions with an average surprise of 5.7 basis points. 80% of the surprises related to tighter 
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policy are a result of the RBA leaving the target rate on hold when the market expects some 
positive probability of a rate reduction. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Patterns in Order Aggressiveness 
Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of order aggressiveness by both retail and institutional 
broker types in terms of market orders (categories 1, 2 and 3) and limit orders (categories 4, 5 and 
6). Note the reliance of both broker-types on the use of limit order submissions, and the much 
higher number of institutional orders4. For all order types there is a clearly identified spike in the 
number of order submissions in the minute following the announcement; this subsides within a 
five-minute period to a level that is higher than that witnessed in the 30-minute period prior to 
the announcement.  
<Insert Figure 1> 
Focusing on the 15-minute interval immediately surrounding the RBA announcement (-5 
min, +10 min), I am able to ascertain a clear picture of the distribution of order aggressiveness of 
both institutional and retail broker types (Table 2). Retail orders are more aggressive on average, 
with the proportion of market orders 50% greater than that for institutional orders. This 
additional aggression is most pronounced for category 1 and 2 orders, and particularly for the 2-
minute period immediately following the announcement. The pattern for both institutional and 
retail orders appears to be for a slight (statistically insignificant) fall in order aggressiveness in the 
10-minutes following the announcement. However, the 1-minute interval immediately following 
the announcement at 14:30 provides an important contrast. In this period, as information is 
processed by the market, and the number of orders is greatest, there is a significant decrease in 
the order aggression of institutional brokers and a significant increase in the aggression of retail 
orders.  
<Insert Table 2> 
I am able to compare the order aggressiveness on days with an announcement to that on 
days without an RBA announcement. I select a random sample of trading days that occur during 
the sample period. To ensure that the comparison is not influenced by a day of the week effect, I 
                                                             
4 NB: Institutional orders are depicted on the right-hand scale.  
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use only trading days that occur on a Tuesday. The pattern of order aggressiveness on days 
without RBA target rate announcements is shown in Table 3. Consistent with Duong et al. (2009) 
I find that both institutional and retail orders tend to be more aggressive on days without a RBA 
announcement. This is consistent with the idea that investors are wary in the presence of the 
greater levels of uncertainty that occur on RBA announcement days.  
<Insert Table 3> 
Effectively, retail orders are demanding a higher amount of liquidity and institutional 
brokers are providing it. An alternative way of considering this is that institutional brokers are 
more wary about been “picked-off” in fast-moving markets and so are making greater use of the 
least aggressive orders (category 6), while retail investors are more concerned about expediency of 
trade execution than price level. One way of testing this is to examine who acts as counterparty to 
trades that are executed as a result of submitted orders, particularly trades that are initiated by 
specific broker types. 
The counterparty for trades executed by broker type is illustrated in Table 4. Panel A 
shows that the majority (approximately 85%) of retail-broker, and institutional-broker, trades 
have an institutional-broker counterparty on the day of a RBA announcement. When trades are 
initiated by a retail broker, the proportion of trades with an institutional broker counterparty 
increases, supporting the idea that institutional orders provide liquidity to retail orders. For trades 
initiated by institutional brokers the proportion of trades with retail and institutional 
counterparties falls, replaced by trades with “other” brokers. Panel B provides similar information 
for the 5-minute period immediately following the RBA announcement. The pattern followed by 
retail brokers is similar, while Institutional orders have a greater proportion of orders executed 
against “other” brokers.   







4.1.1 Effect of Firm Size on Order Aggressiveness Pattern 
Table 5 dissects this order submission pattern further, partitioning the orders into those 
for small-cap, mid-cap, and large-cap stocks. For retail orders there is a similar pattern across all 
three firm sizes, such that the order aggressiveness increases markedly from the minute prior to 
the announcement until two minutes after the announcement when it reverts to some normal 
level. However, institutional orders in the largest, most liquid stocks appear to behave differently 
than those for small-cap and mid-cap stocks. For large-cap stocks, order aggression is significantly 
lower than usual in the 2-minutes prior to the announcement (over 50% of orders are in the least 
aggressive category 6) and then rises significantly immediately following the announcement 
before declining once more. For mid-cap and small-cap stocks, the reverse pattern is evidenced, 
with greater aggression prior to the meeting and less aggression afterwards. The different patterns 
identified for institutional orders suggest that liquidity concerns are a driver of order aggression. 
<Insert Table 5> 
The literature concerning the effects of monetary policy decisions, and macroeconomic 
announcements more generally, on market activity indicates that order aggressiveness might be 
dependent on the direction of the target rate surprise. Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of order 
aggression for retail and institutional brokers across firm sizes, and for monetary policy decisions 
that are easier than expected, tighter than expected, and as expected. The number of orders in 
each interval is highest when the decision is ‘as expected’, in this sample this tends to occur when 
the market is expecting no change in the target rate and the RBA concurs. In such cases, there is 
relatively little information asymmetry and little effect on overall market activity. Notably, retail 
orders seem to react to an ‘as expected’ result much more than do institutional orders. For cases of 
decisions that are ‘tighter than expected’, which commonly result from the RBA not changing 
rates when the market was expecting a reduction, there is a significant spike in the number of 
orders and also in the proportion of more aggressive market orders. Once the initial response to 
the news has passed, the number of orders settles to a level higher than that preceding the 
announcement. Finally, the number of orders is lowest for cases when the decision is ‘easier than 
expected’, which commonly occur when the market is expecting a reduction in the target rate and 
the RBA exceeds expectations, although the proportionate jump in order volume and order 
aggression following the announcement is also the greatest.  
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<Insert Figure 2> 
4.1.2 Effect of Financial Firms on Order Aggressiveness Pattern 
Given the nature of financial firms, and the impact of changes in monetary policy on their 
earnings and stock price, it is natural to suppose that the pattern of order aggressiveness may 
differ from that of non-financial firms in the period around the announcement. Figure 3 
illustrates the order submission choice for firms classified as financial and non-financial according 
to the 2-digit GICS sector code5. The pattern noted earlier appears to hold for both firm-types and 
broker-types, with the number of orders lower before the announcement, spiking at the 
announcement, and then maintaining a level that is higher than pre-announcement. Limit orders 
are again predominant for both broker-types, and for both firm-types. The proportionate jump in 
orders submitted by institutional (80%) and retail (100%) brokers in the minute following the 
announcement is approximately the same for financial and non-financial firms. That is, at first 
pass there appears to be little difference between the order submission strategy for financial and 
non-financial firms.  
<Insert Figure 3> 
Looking at the order aggressiveness in more detail (Table 6) does indicate some difference. 
For institutional orders (Panel A), the level of aggressiveness for orders placed in the stocks of 
financial firms is more aggressive, particularly in the most aggressive (category 1) orders.  While 
for retail orders (Panel B), the aggressiveness is actually higher for non-financial stocks. The 
results are interesting as one might expect order aggressiveness to be concentrated in sectors that 
have the greatest response to monetary policy news, determined by Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
(2004) as technology, communication, and cyclical consumer goods rather than financial.  
<Insert Table 6> 
4.2 Determinants of Order Aggressiveness 
Having established preliminary evidence of order submission patterns surrounding the 
announcement of RBA target rate decisions, I seek to empirically examine the determinants of 
order aggressiveness for institutional and retail brokers over the course of a trading day when an 
RBA policy announcement is made. In order to do this I utilise an ordered probit model of the 
                                                             
5 Approximately 20% of the sample is classified as financial. 
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form suggested by Griffiths et al. (2000), Ranaldo (2004), and Duong et al. (2009). In this model, 
the dependent variable is the level of order aggressiveness, as classified according to Biasis et al. 
(1995).  
Following Duong et al. (2009), several explanatory variables are used to control for 
liquidity conditions including the same-side market depth, the opposite-side market depth, the 
relative bid-ask spread, volatility, order size, and direction of order. The same-side (opposite-side) 
market depth is defined as the natural logarithm of the same-side (opposite-side) market depth, in 
terms of the number of shares, at the time of order submission. The relative bid-ask spread is the 
percentage of the bid-ask spread over the bid-ask mid-point, at the time of order submission. As 
in Ranaldo (2004), volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the 20 most recent mid-quote 
returns multiplied by 100. The order size is the natural logarithm of number of shares in a 
particular order. Ranaldo (2004) also documents a potential asymmetry of aggression level 
between buy and sell orders and so I include a dummy variable indicating whether the order is to 
buy (0) or sell (1). 
I augment this specification with three additional variables to explain the influence of the 
RBA target rate decision. First, given the order submission pattern already identified it is possible 
that order aggressiveness will differ in the period immediately following the RBA announcement, 
and so a dummy variable (RBA_1Mk) is included to indicate whether the order is submitted in the 
1st minute following the announcement (1) or not (0). Second, a variable is included to indicate 
the ex-ante market expectation of the RBA decision (RBA_Expectedk). Third, a variable is 
included to indicate the surprise component of the RBA announcement (RBA_Surprisek); this 
variable is set to 0 prior to the announcement when by definition there can be no surprise. Thus I 
use the following ordered probit specification in this empirical analysis, with Zk as the latent 
order aggressiveness: 
𝑍𝑘 = 𝛽1𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑇ℎ_𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑇𝐷𝑇ℎ_𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑘 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑘 + 𝛽4𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑉𝑘 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑇_𝑆𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑘 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑉_𝑂𝑇𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑘
+ 𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝐴_1𝑀𝑘 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑇𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑘 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝐴_𝑆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑇𝑉𝑆𝑇𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘                                       (3) 
Table 7 presents the results of my empirical analysis for all orders. For small-cap, mid-cap, 
and large-cap firms the first column represents the average coefficient of each of the 30 firms 
within the size category. The second and third column denotes the proportion of firms for which 
that coefficient was statistically significant (at the 1% level) and negative or statistically 
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significant and positive respectively. Note that more aggressive orders are assigned a lower 
category number and so a negative (positive) coefficient implies increased (decreased) order 
aggressiveness as the magnitude of the independent variable increases. 
<Insert Table 7> 
The pattern for depth-at-same and depth-at-opposite is similar for both institutional and 
retail orders; consistent with the extant literature the relationship is negative (positive) for depth-
at-same (depth-at-opposite) indicating that order aggressiveness increases (decreases) with the 
number of shares on the same (opposite) side  increases. This makes intuitive sense since a larger 
number of shares on the same (opposite) side reduces (increases) the likelihood of order 
execution. The magnitude of the coefficient decreases as the firm size falls, and for small firms the 
coefficient for depth-at-opposite actually becomes negative. One explanation for this may be that 
for such illiquid, small firms, any increase in liquidity (such as shares on the opposite size of the 
spread) is seized upon. The relative bid-ask spread has a positive relationship with the order 
aggressiveness variable, indicating that orders are less aggressive as the spread widens; this is 
consistent with investors (institutional and retail) not wanting to incur the higher cost of crossing 
wider spreads. This relationship is strongest for mid-cap stocks.  
Consistent with Aitken et al. (2007a), an increase in volatility is associated with more 
aggressive orders, particularly for retail brokers placing orders in small firms. Foucalt (1999) 
suggests that higher volatility raises the likelihood of “picking off”, and so it may be that this 
increased order aggression in volatile times is a result of orders attempting to “pick off” limit 
orders left in the order book. Smales (2012b) highlights the possibility of such “picking off” of 
stale orders in the period around RBA target rate decisions. For both institutional and retail 
orders, sell orders are more aggressive for large-cap and mid-cap firms and less aggressive for 
small-cap firms. One explanation for this is of the higher level of information asymmetry and 
higher cost of (short-) selling small-cap stocks (Diether et al., 2009). In addition to lower levels of 
information asymmetry, large cap stocks are also likely to be more intensely monitored and so the 
accompanying risk of being “picked-off” is also higher. 
The main difference between institutional and retail investors appears to be the effect of 
order size. For retail brokers, the coefficient for order size is generally positive suggesting that 
larger orders are less aggressive and perhaps indicating that investors using such services are more 
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concerned with execution price than with execution speed. For institutional investors the effect 
of order size is mixed. For mid-cap (small-cap) firms where liquidity is higher (lower) then order 
size has a negative (positive) relationship in general. However, for large-cap firms whilst order 
size has a significant impact on 28 (out of 30) firms, the relationship is finely balanced between 
negative and positive instances. 
Considering the variables relevant to the RBA decision, the coefficient for the dummy 
variable indicating the interval immediately following the announcement is positive for 
institutional orders (particularly for large-cap firms), and negative for retail orders except in the 
case of small firms. This result is consistent with the patterns highlighted earlier, such that 
institutional orders are less aggressive in the period immediately following the announcement, 
while retail orders are more aggressive. There is no clear relationship between order 
aggressiveness and market expectations surrounding the RBA decision in the case of institutional 
brokers with an equal amount of positive and negative coefficients. However, market expectations 
do seem to play a role in explaining the order aggressiveness of retail brokers; a positive (negative) 
coefficient for large-cap (mid-cap and small-cap) firms indicating that order aggressiveness 
decreases (increases) as expectations of tighter monetary policy rise. Finally, there is a significant 
relationship for the effect of the RBA target rate surprise across institutional and retail orders, and 
this is particularly strong for small-cap firms. The positive coefficient indicates that order 
aggressiveness increases (decreases) as the RBA surprises with easier (tighter) policy. The extant 
literature reports that market returns are more volatile in response to surprise easing, and so this 
result is consistent with the finding that orders are more aggressive when volatility is highest. 
I investigate the asymmetry of buy and sell orders identified in Ranaldo (2004) by 
disaggregating the orders into those placed on the bid side, and those placed on the ask side, and 
then repeating my analysis. Table 8 presents the results for the buy and sell orders submissions 
disaggregated by both institutional and retail brokers. Panel A and Panel B relates to institutional 
brokers. In general, the results are qualitatively similar to those already identified. However, 
market expectations concerning the RBA decision play an important role in this disaggregated 
model, with a positive (negative) relationship for buy (sell) orders indicating that as expectations 
of tighter policy increase then buy (sell) orders are less (more) aggressive. Since tighter (easier) 
monetary policy is consistent with stock prices falling (rising) this result is consistent with 
institutional brokers been less (more) willing to buy (sell) stocks.  
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<Insert Table 8> 
Panel C and Panel D report the results for the determinants of buy and sell orders 
submitted by retail brokers. Again, the relationships are broadly similar to those for the 
aggregated orders, although the importance of market expectations pertaining to the policy 
decision is emphasised once more, with a significant and positive (negative) relationship for buy 
(sell) orders. In addition, the effect of the order being submitted in the immediate aftermath of 
the announcement appears to be dependent on whether the order is to buy or sell. Buy orders 
from retail brokers appear to be less aggressive in the minute following the RBA announcement; 
this is consistent with institutional orders. On the other hand, retail sell orders tend to be more 
aggressive following the decision.  
5. Inferences from empirical results 
Consistent with the extant literature6 on the market impact of macroeconomic 
announcements in general, and monetary policy news in particular, there is a sharp increase in 
market activity in the period immediately following RBA announcements. The scale of this 
reaction is dependent on both the magnitude and direction of the surprise component of the 
target rate decision. Orders are more prevalent, and more aggressive, when information 
asymmetry is lowest and there is a lesser quantity of information to absorb before entering an 
order into the market; this most commonly occurs when market expectations of the RBA leaving 
rates on hold come to fruition. This is also consistent with the finding that orders are more 
aggressive on days without RBA target rate announcements. Conversely, orders are less 
ubiquitous, and less aggressive, when the market is surprised by easier monetary policy.  
On average, retail orders are more aggressive than those placed by institutions and this 
difference is polarized further in the period that follows RBA rate decisions as institutional 
brokers make greater use of the least aggressive orders. In this interval, retail brokers are 
demanding a higher amount of liquidity that is then provided by institutional brokers. If I assume 
that institutional orders are more informed, in the sense that they can more readily interpret the 
policy decision, then this evolving liquidity provision is consistent with the experimental results 
of Bloomfield et al. (2005). An alternative way of considering this dynamic process, consistent 
                                                             
6 For example, Ederington and Lee (1993,1995), Fargher and Weigand (1998), Fatum and Scholnick (2008), 
and Smales (2013) 
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with Foucalt (1999), is that institutional brokers are more wary about been “picked-off” in fast-
moving markets, with increased levels of information asymmetry, and so make greater use of limit 
orders, while retail investors are more concerned about expediency of trade execution. This fear 
of being “picked-off” is also evident in the negative relationship between volatility and order 
aggression. Such evidence also fits with the “value-motivated traders” identified by Harris (1998) 
who demand immediacy when they believe the stock is mis-valued (immediately after the 
announcement) and otherwise set limit orders to profit from pricing errors that may arise.  
It is possible to test which of these alternatives is most likely to be correct by performing a 
simple experiment. I focus on trades7 that occur in the period immediately following RBA 
announcements, and consider the price impact (in terms of absolute returns following trade 
initiation) of those trades that occur between two groups. Group 1 are trades initiated by retail 
brokers with an institutional broker as counterparty. Group 2 has trades initiated by retail brokers 
with non-institutional counterparties. If the price impact of trades in group 1 is lower than those 
of group 2, then it is likely that institutional investors are engaging in informed limit order 
trading. Table 9 presents evidence to this effect. The price impact is lower in group 1 and so it 
appears institutional investors are indeed more informed than retail investors, and this is 
particularly true in the case of large-cap stocks.  
<Insert Table 9> 
Disaggregating orders into buy and sell types reveals further evidence that order 
aggression is related to the market expectations and interpretation of the RBA target rate 
decisions; with institutional brokers less (more) willing to buy (sell) shares ahead of rate hikes 
(cuts) which are associated with stock price falls (increases). 
A combination of the likelihood and the cost of order execution plays an important role in 
determining the aggressiveness of orders placed by both institutional and retail brokers. Factors 
that improve the likelihood of the order being executed (lower depth-at-same, higher depth-at-
opposite) and factors that increase the cost of execution (higher bid-ask spreads) serve to reduce 
order aggressiveness. Liquidity concerns appear to play a role in the divergent order 
aggressiveness patterns identified for institutional orders in firms of different sizes. For large-cap 
                                                             




stocks, order aggression is lower prior to the decision, rises as the decision is announced, and then 
subsides; the reverse is found for small-cap and mid-cap stocks. Such results align with the work 
of Ranaldo (2004) and Duong et al. (2009) 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the pattern of order aggressiveness, and the determinants of this 
pattern, for institutional and retail brokers in the interval around RBA monetary policy 
announcements. I identify a sharp increase in the number of orders submitted to the order book 
following the announcement. Apparently, orders are more numerous, and more aggressive, when 
there is less information for investors to digest. On average, retail orders are more aggressive and 
are exclusively concerned with the likelihood of order execution. The submission decision of 
institutional brokers is more nuanced and evolves over time as market conditions change and 
information arrives. Differences in order aggressiveness are recognized on the basis of firm-size 
and industry. 
The study fills an important gap in the literature concerning the order submission process 
by considering the influence of important news events on the choice of aggressiveness level. The 
results add to the discussion on market efficiency and liquidity provision at times of intense 
market activity. This provides greater cognizance to investors seeking to minimise trading costs, 
and maximise returns, in the optimization of their trading decisions. The results are also 
important for central banks in understanding the impact of their announcements on market 
liquidity and asset prices, and policy makers in determining exchange rules. 
Further research in this area may consider whether different broker-types have an 
informational advantage in terms of the subsequent performance of their executed trades. It may 
also be possible to incorporate a broader range of macroeconomic announcements in order to test 
the generalizability of the results. Finally, practitioners and policy makers are likely to be 
interested in more explicit measurements of trading costs and execution likelihood during the 
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Appendix A 
The order book data provides a broker identity number for each order that is submitted. This 
number is matched with a broker name from a list provided directly from SIRCA. I then classify 
each broker into one of five distinct categories: retail, institutional, mixed (retail and 
institutional), market-maker, and other. Six broker numbers do not have a match in the name-list 
and so as classified as “other”. The steps I take to assign the broker classification are as follows: 
i. Check broker’s existing or archived website. 
ii. If no website exists or the broker-type cannot be determined, search Factiva for newspaper 
articles, trade journals, company announcements, or web articles on the broker. 
iii. If no Factiva articles exist to classify the broker, use a Google search for any credible articles 
that may classify the broker. 
iv. If the broker still exists today but has no identifying information from any of the sources in 
the first 3 steps, I telephone the broker and ask for their targeted clientele and services. 
v. If a broker’s classification cannot be determined from steps 1-4, the broker is classified as 
‘Other’. 
Figure 1: Number of orders placed by institutional and retail brokers around RBA target rate announcement
This figure depicts the number of orders submitted by institutional and retail brokers in the 1-hour period (-30min, +30min)
around the 14:30 (AEST) RBA target rate announcement. Orders of aggressiveness in categories 1, 2, and 3 are grouped as
market orders. Orders with aggressiveness levels 4, 5, and 6 are grouped as limit orders. The number of retail orders is shown
on the left-hand scale, the (larger) number of institutional orders is displayed on the right-hand scale. Sample includes RBA























Figure 2: Number of orders placed by institutional and retail brokers as a result of RBA target rate surprises
This chart depicts the number of orders submitted by institutional (Panel A) and retail (Panel B) brokers in the 1-hour period (-30min, +30min) around the 14:30 (AEST) RBA target rate announcement. Panels x.i , x.ii , and x.iii illustrate patterns for small-cap,
mid-cap, and large-cap firms respectively. MO refers to market orders (categories 1, 2, 3) and LO refers to limit orders (categories 4, 5, 6). Easier refers to RBA target rate decisions that surprise the market with easier than expected policy. Tighter refers to RBA
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Figure 3 : Number of orders placed by institutional and retail brokers in financial and non-financial firms around RBA target rate announcement
This figure depicts the number of orders submitted by institutional and retail brokers in the 1-hour period (-30min, +30min) around the 14:30 (AEST) RBA target rate announcement. Firms are classified as Financial or non-Financial 
according to their 2-digit GICS sector code. Orders of aggressiveness in categories 1, 2, and 3 are grouped as market orders. Orders with aggressiveness levels 4, 5, and 6 are grouped as limit orders. Panel A displays orders placed through 
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Firm Size Turnover Share Volume Trade Volume Relative Spread Return Mkt Cap ($MM)
Large-Cap 87,273,538       7,546,618             6,121              0.045                0.046-                25,477.4            
Mid-Cap 11,794,780       2,482,646             2,657              0.122                0.024-                2,721.1              
Small-Cap 2,578,828         618,588                1,002              0.160                0.016-                902.2                 
Most Traded (BHP) 416,548,562     11,196,875           15,368            0.004                0.038-                122,064.4          
Least Traded (VRL) 535,409            117,741                281                 0.631                0.160               546.0                 
Panel B: Order Submission
Aggressiveness Level Frequency % of all orders Order Size Order Value Relative spread Volatility Depth at same Depth at opposite
Institutional Orders
1 17,934              3.91% 1,576              22,530              0.119 0.109 28,532             151,075                
2 4,404                0.96% 7,617              52,855              0.091 0.081 20,563             123,689                
3 25,645              5.59% 1,580              15,254              0.163 0.054 103,881           474,283                
4 5,130                1.12% 2,318              20,762              0.184 0.118 5,884               36,276                  
5 196,300            42.83% 2,622              31,021              0.174 0.062 85,021             435,854                
6 208,960            45.59% 1,647              21,044              0.097 0.081 34,525             186,086                
Retail Orders
1 2,892                6.91% 1,576              18,814              0.731 0.109 41,878             228,257                
2 827                   1.97% 5,143              65,677              0.032 0.096 13,997             81,925                  
3 2,725                6.51% 2,252              8,348                0.152 0.070 148,377           712,202                
4 1,126                2.69% 1,291              35,504              0.196 0.121 4,764               28,039                  
5 12,892              30.78% 2,750              15,532              0.159 0.072 76,247             357,624                
6 21,417              51.14% 1,905              15,027              0.082 0.082 41,143             210,415                
This table provides descriptive statistics for the stocks and order submission of institutional and retail brokers used in this study. Panel A provides summary statistics for
stocks classified as large-cap (S&P/ASX50), mid-cap (S&P/ASX100 but not S&P/ASX50) and small-cap (S&P/ASX200 but not S&P/ASX100). In addition, statistics are
provided for the most traded stock in the sample (BHP) and the least traded stock (VRL). Turnover is the average value of shares traded on a daily basis, share volume is
the average number of shares traded on a daily basis, trade volume is the daily average number of trades, relative spread is the percentage of the percentage of the bid-ask
spread over the bid-ask midpoint, return is the average daily percentage return, and market capitalisation is the average market capitalisation over the course of the
sample period. In each case, the reported value is for the average stock within the particular firm size category. Panel B reports statistics for order submission where
orders are classified according to the six aggressiveness levels of Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid)
quote and order size exceeding the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote, and are the most aggressive. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the
best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid). Category 3 orders are orders with the price equal to the opposite best quote and
demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and Category 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes. Category 6
orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes and are the least aggressive. Frequency is the average number of orders submitted at
that aggressiveness level on an average trading day containing an RBA target rate decision. Order size is the average number of share submitted in an order and order
value is the value of those shares. Relative spread is calculated as the percentage of the bid-ask spread over the bid-ask mid-point. Volatility is the average volatility at
the time of a submitted order at that level, calculated as the standard deviation of the most recent 20 mid-quote returns at the time of the order submission multiplied by
100. Depth-at-same is the average number of shares at the 10 best same-side quotes at the time of order submission. Depth-at-opposite is the average number of shares at
the 10 best opposire-side quotes at the time of order submission. The reported orders submissions are the average occuring during the whole trading day of an RBA
announcement.
The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 December 2007 - 02 December 2014. 
Table	2
The pattern of order aggressiveness in the period surrounding RBA target rate announcements
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Institutional Orders 
14:25-14:26 0.035     0.010     0.057     0.010    0.435   0.453   0.102   0.898    1195
14:26-14:27 0.038     0.009     0.056     0.008    0.427   0.462   0.102   0.898    1234
14:27-14:28 0.036     0.009     0.054     0.009    0.424   0.468   0.099   0.901    1185
14:28-14:29 0.036     0.009     0.057     0.009    0.427   0.462   0.102   0.898    1236
14:29-14:30 0.038     0.009     0.054     0.010    0.418   0.472   0.101   0.899    1301
14:30-14:31 0.028     0.010     0.048     0.014    0.401   0.499   0.086   0.914    2342
14:31-14:32 0.034     0.010     0.047     0.015    0.413   0.481   0.091   0.909    1759
14:32-14:33 0.037     0.010     0.041     0.013    0.412   0.486   0.088   0.912    1637
14:33-14:34 0.036     0.010     0.044     0.014    0.414   0.482   0.090   0.910    1568
14:34-14:35 0.036     0.009     0.044     0.011    0.420   0.480   0.089   0.911    1496
14:35-14:36 0.035     0.009     0.047     0.012    0.422   0.475   0.091   0.909    1518
14:36-14:37 0.035     0.009     0.048     0.010    0.426   0.471   0.092   0.908    1509
14:37-14:38 0.037     0.009     0.045     0.011    0.420   0.478   0.091   0.909    1572
14:38-14:39 0.034     0.010     0.051     0.012    0.420   0.472   0.095   0.905    1424
14:39-14:40 0.040     0.009     0.048     0.010    0.421   0.472   0.097   0.903    1455
Panel B: Retail Orders
14:25-14:26 0.058     0.017     0.061     0.019    0.327   0.517   0.136   0.864    104
14:26-14:27 0.065     0.017     0.064     0.018    0.312   0.524   0.146   0.854    109
14:27-14:28 0.068     0.015     0.058     0.020    0.337   0.502   0.142   0.858    108
14:28-14:29 0.060     0.018     0.067     0.018    0.332   0.504   0.145   0.855    105
14:29-14:30 0.056     0.022     0.073     0.020    0.311   0.518   0.151   0.849    114
14:30-14:31 0.070     0.022     0.067     0.049    0.321   0.471   0.159   0.841    221
14:31-14:32 0.058     0.022     0.059     0.048    0.338   0.474   0.139   0.861    182
14:32-14:33 0.059     0.021     0.055     0.030    0.343   0.492   0.134   0.866    159
14:33-14:34 0.063     0.019     0.053     0.036    0.337   0.492   0.135   0.865    149
14:34-14:35 0.057     0.019     0.063     0.030    0.345   0.485   0.140   0.860    142
14:35-14:36 0.063     0.020     0.053     0.024    0.352   0.487   0.136   0.864    138
14:36-14:37 0.052     0.021     0.063     0.040    0.375   0.450   0.135   0.865    140
14:37-14:38 0.063     0.019     0.061     0.026    0.361   0.470   0.143   0.857    145
14:38-14:39 0.064     0.019     0.064     0.027    0.375   0.452   0.147   0.853    135
14:39-14:40 0.065     0.019     0.062     0.029    0.367   0.458   0.146   0.854    137
The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 December 2007 - 02 December 
This table presents information on the pattern of order aggressiveness in the period surrounding the RBA target rate
decision at 14:30 (AEST). The period runs from 5-minutes prior to the announcement to 10-minutes after the
announcement. Orders are classified according to the six aggressiveness levels of Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders
are buy (sell) orders with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and order size exceeding the market depth at
the best ask (bid) quote, and are the most aggressive. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best
ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid). Category 3 orders are orders with
the price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote.
Category 4 and Category 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes. Category 6 orders are buy (sell)
orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes and are the least aggressive. The numbers reported are the
proportion of orders falling within each category in the given interval. MO is the proportion of market orders
consisting of order aggression levels 1, 2, and 3. LO is the proportion of limit orders consisting of order aggression levels
4, 5, and 6. Orders in interval provides an indication of the average number of all orders posted in that particular
interval on the day of an RBA target rate decision.
Interval
Order Aggressiveness Level
MO LO Orders in Interval
Table	3





Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6 Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6
All Firms All Firms
14:28-14:29 0.022     0.085       0.136           0.008        0.363         0.386         0.243   0.757   14:28-14:29 0.071   0.082   0.177   0.025   0.272   0.373   0.329   0.670    
14:29-14:30 0.021     0.092       0.129           0.018        0.346         0.394         0.242   0.758   14:29-14:30 0.063   0.080   0.176   0.027   0.256   0.395   0.319   0.678    
14:30-14:31 0.029     0.082       0.144           0.012        0.324         0.409         0.255   0.745   14:30-14:31 0.068   0.073   0.155   0.051   0.268   0.383   0.296   0.702    
14:31-14:32 0.028     0.090       0.126           0.022        0.337         0.397         0.244   0.756   14:31-14:32 0.067   0.082   0.166   0.049   0.275   0.364   0.316   0.688    
14:32-14:33 0.028     0.100       0.112           0.011        0.349         0.400         0.240   0.760   14:32-14:33 0.072   0.080   0.155   0.034   0.287   0.366   0.307   0.688    
14:33-14:34 0.027     0.098       0.121           0.016        0.341         0.397         0.245   0.755   14:33-14:34 0.075   0.076   0.145   0.039   0.283   0.378   0.296   0.700    
14:34-14:35 0.026     0.108       0.129           0.009        0.332         0.395         0.263   0.737   14:34-14:35 0.065   0.074   0.164   0.034   0.281   0.377   0.303   0.692    
This table presents information on the pattern of order aggressiveness, in the period surrounding the RBA target rate decision at 14:30 (AEST). The period runs from 2-minutes prior to the announcement to 5-minutes after the
announcement. Orders are classified according to the six aggressiveness levels of Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and order size exceeding the market
depth at the best ask (bid) quote, and are the most aggressive. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid). Category 3
orders are orders with the price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and Category 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes.
Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes and are the least aggressive. The numbers reported are the proportion of orders falling within each category in the given interval. MO  
the proportion of market orders consisting of order aggression levels 1, 2, and 3. LO is the proportion of limit orders consisting of order aggression levels 4, 5, and 6. A random sample of 100 (Tuesday) trading days that do not include
a RBA announcement are included in the analysis






Who is the counterparty on RBA announcement day?
Countparty % Trades Countparty % Trades
Panel A: All trades on RBA announcement day
Retail 7.8% Retail 6.1%
All Retail Institutional 83.3% Retail Initiated Institutional 86.5%
Other 8.9% Other 7.4%
Retail 13.6% Retail 8.8%
All Institutional Institutional 85.3% Institutional Initiated Institutional 83.5%
Other 1.2% Other 7.8%
Panel B: Trades occuring in the 5-minutes post-RBA announcement
Retail 7.6% Retail 6.4%
All Retail Institutional 82.9% Retail Initiated Institutional 85.4%
Other 9.5% Other 8.2%
Retail 11.7% Retail 9.2%
All Institutional Institutional 77.5% Institutional Initiated Institutional 82.5%
Other 10.8% Other 8.3%
This table presents information regarding the counterparty for trades executed on the day of the RBA monetary policy 
announcement. Panel A shows data for all trades on the announcement day, with the left most column depicting the 
counterparty for all retail and institutional trades, while the right most columns show the counterparty for trades 
initiated by retail and institutional investors. Panel B shows similar information but only for the 5-minute period (14:30-
14:35) following the RBA announcement.
The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 December 2007 - 02 December 
Table	5
The pattern of order aggressiveness in the period surrounding RBA target rate announcements for different sized firms
Panel A: Institutional Orders Panel B: Retail Orders
Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6 Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6
Large-Cap Large-Cap
14:28-14:29 0.022   0.021     0.036     0.005   0.383   0.534   0.078   0.922   14:28-14:29 0.029   0.059   0.081   0.007   0.411   0.414   0.169   0.831     
14:29-14:30 0.018   0.019     0.033     0.009   0.362   0.559   0.070   0.930   14:29-14:30 0.054   0.041   0.091   0.018   0.361   0.436   0.186   0.814     
14:30-14:31 0.025   0.030     0.052     0.017   0.501   0.375   0.107   0.893   14:30-14:31 0.067   0.049   0.084   0.036   0.355   0.410   0.200   0.800     
14:31-14:32 0.020   0.041     0.067     0.012   0.412   0.449   0.127   0.873   14:31-14:32 0.043   0.044   0.071   0.035   0.381   0.427   0.157   0.843     
14:32-14:33 0.030   0.024     0.045     0.010   0.475   0.418   0.098   0.902   14:32-14:33 0.055   0.063   0.053   0.029   0.371   0.429   0.171   0.829     
14:33-14:34 0.021   0.027     0.029     0.007   0.355   0.562   0.076   0.924   14:33-14:34 0.044   0.060   0.067   0.026   0.415   0.387   0.172   0.828     
14:34-14:35 0.032   0.035     0.032     0.007   0.524   0.369   0.100   0.900   14:34-14:35 0.057   0.039   0.082   0.020   0.385   0.416   0.178   0.822     
Mid-Cap Mid-Cap
14:28-14:29 0.084   0.063     0.081     0.009   0.470   0.292   0.229   0.771   14:28-14:29 0.056   0.040   0.080   0.012   0.313   0.499   0.175   0.825     
14:29-14:30 0.028   0.046     0.042     0.023   0.500   0.360   0.117   0.883   14:29-14:30 0.037   0.056   0.129   0.008   0.444   0.326   0.222   0.778     
14:30-14:31 0.030   0.043     0.038     0.013   0.503   0.373   0.111   0.889   14:30-14:31 0.025   0.072   0.042   0.085   0.295   0.481   0.139   0.861     
14:31-14:32 0.021   0.029     0.042     0.020   0.486   0.401   0.092   0.908   14:31-14:32 0.058   0.077   0.053   0.048   0.342   0.421   0.189   0.811     
14:32-14:33 0.053   0.040     0.049     0.013   0.496   0.349   0.143   0.857   14:32-14:33 0.041   0.035   0.034   0.048   0.324   0.518   0.110   0.890     
14:33-14:34 0.024   0.038     0.041     0.017   0.524   0.356   0.103   0.897   14:33-14:34 0.044   0.061   0.057   0.039   0.383   0.415   0.163   0.837     
14:34-14:35 0.080   0.044     0.036     0.009   0.465   0.367   0.160   0.840   14:34-14:35 0.029   0.082   0.050   0.037   0.399   0.402   0.162   0.838     
Small-Cap Small-Cap
14:28-14:29 0.034   0.019     0.029     0.026   0.488   0.405   0.082   0.918   14:28-14:29 0.021   0.050   0.015   0.002   0.436   0.476   0.086   0.914     
14:29-14:30 0.042   0.041     0.048     0.021   0.455   0.393   0.131   0.869   14:29-14:30 0.032   0.057   0.040   0.006   0.558   0.307   0.129   0.871     
14:30-14:31 0.024   0.022     0.059     0.015   0.480   0.401   0.105   0.895   14:30-14:31 0.034   0.036   0.115   0.022   0.268   0.524   0.186   0.814     
14:31-14:32 0.021   0.052     0.022     0.048   0.492   0.364   0.095   0.905   14:31-14:32 0.015   0.044   0.167   0.028   0.411   0.335   0.226   0.774     
14:32-14:33 0.026   0.068     0.018     0.015   0.581   0.293   0.111   0.889   14:32-14:33 0.009   0.049   0.020   0.006   0.404   0.512   0.078   0.922     
14:33-14:34 0.029   0.029     0.060     0.013   0.515   0.354   0.118   0.882   14:33-14:34 0.026   0.019   0.069   0.007   0.517   0.362   0.114   0.886     
14:34-14:35 0.044   0.042     0.018     0.020   0.465   0.412   0.103   0.897   14:34-14:35 0.019   0.007   0.048   0.012   0.253   0.662   0.074   0.926     
The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 December 2007 - 02 December 2014. 
Order Aggressiveness Level
MO LO
This table presents information on the pattern of order aggressiveness, by firm-size, in the period surrounding the RBA target rate decision at 14:30 (AEST). The period runs from 2-minutes prior to the announcement to 5-minutes
after the announcement. Orders are classified according to the six aggressiveness levels of Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote and order size exceeding the
market depth at the best ask (bid) quote, and are the most aggressive. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than the market depth at the best ask (bid). Category 
3 orders are orders with the price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and Category 5 orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes.
Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes and are the least aggressive. The numbers reported are the proportion of orders falling within each category in the given interval. MO is
the proportion of market orders consisting of order aggression levels 1, 2, and 3. LO is the proportion of limit orders consisting of order aggression levels 4, 5, and 6. Large-Cap firms are those firms in the sample that are members of
the S&P/ASX50. Mid-Cap firms are those firms in the sample that are members of the S&P/ASX100 but not members of the S&P/ASX50. Small-Cap firms are those firms in the sample that are members of the S&P/ASX200 but not




The pattern of order aggressiveness in the period surrounding RBA target rate announcements for financial and non-financial firms
Panel A: Institutional Orders Panel B: Retail Orders
Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6 Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6
Financial Financial
14:28-14:29 0.043   0.009   0.060   0.008   0.421   0.459   0.112   0.888   14:28-14:29 0.050   0.016   0.067   0.016   0.384   0.468   0.132   0.868   
14:29-14:30 0.042   0.008   0.052   0.009   0.410   0.479   0.103   0.897   14:29-14:30 0.044   0.021   0.061   0.023   0.370   0.482   0.126   0.874   
14:30-14:31 0.038   0.010   0.047   0.005   0.383   0.517   0.095   0.905   14:30-14:31 0.058   0.020   0.055   0.052   0.370   0.445   0.133   0.867   
14:31-14:32 0.040   0.010   0.048   0.014   0.397   0.491   0.098   0.902   14:31-14:32 0.056   0.017   0.060   0.047   0.399   0.421   0.133   0.867   
14:32-14:33 0.037   0.011   0.045   0.013   0.403   0.490   0.093   0.907   14:32-14:33 0.053   0.020   0.047   0.029   0.408   0.442   0.121   0.879   
14:33-14:34 0.036   0.010   0.046   0.014   0.410   0.483   0.092   0.908   14:33-14:34 0.055   0.016   0.048   0.034   0.386   0.460   0.119   0.881   
14:34-14:35 0.044   0.009   0.046   0.011   0.406   0.484   0.098   0.902   14:34-14:35 0.051   0.017   0.051   0.036   0.396   0.448   0.120   0.880   
Non-Financial Non-Financial
14:28-14:29 0.033   0.009   0.056   0.009   0.428   0.464   0.099   0.901   14:28-14:29 0.064   0.019   0.067   0.020   0.314   0.517   0.150   0.850   
14:29-14:30 0.037   0.009   0.054   0.010   0.421   0.469   0.101   0.899   14:29-14:30 0.060   0.022   0.078   0.019   0.288   0.532   0.160   0.840   
14:30-14:31 0.027   0.010   0.049   0.014   0.407   0.493   0.086   0.914   14:30-14:31 0.074   0.023   0.072   0.048   0.302   0.481   0.169   0.831   
14:31-14:32 0.031   0.011   0.046   0.015   0.419   0.478   0.088   0.912   14:31-14:32 0.059   0.025   0.058   0.049   0.312   0.497   0.142   0.858   
14:32-14:33 0.037   0.010   0.040   0.013   0.416   0.484   0.087   0.913   14:32-14:33 0.061   0.021   0.057   0.031   0.317   0.512   0.140   0.860   
14:33-14:34 0.036   0.009   0.043   0.014   0.416   0.481   0.089   0.911   14:33-14:34 0.066   0.020   0.054   0.037   0.318   0.505   0.141   0.859   
14:34-14:35 0.034   0.009   0.043   0.011   0.424   0.479   0.086   0.914   14:34-14:35 0.060   0.020   0.068   0.028   0.325   0.499   0.148   0.852   
The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 December 2007 - 02 December 2014. 
This table presents information on the pattern of order aggressiveness, by industry, in the period surrounding the RBA target rate decision at 14:30 (AEST). The period runs from 2-minutes prior to the announcement 
to 5-minutes after the announcement. Orders are classified according to the six aggressiveness levels of Biais et al. (1995). Category 1 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices greater (less) than the best ask (bid) quote 
and order size exceeding the market depth at the best ask (bid) quote, and are the most aggressive. Category 2 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices equal to the best ask (bid) quote and demand more volume than 
the market depth at the best ask (bid). Category 3 orders are orders with the price equal to the opposite best quote and demand less volume than the market depth at the opposite best quote. Category 4 and Category 5 
orders are limit orders within and at the prevailing quotes. Category 6 orders are buy (sell) orders with prices less (greater) than the best bid (ask) quotes and are the least aggressive. The numbers reported are the 
proportion of orders falling within each category in the given interval. MO is the proportion of market orders consisting of order aggression levels 1, 2, and 3. LO is the proportion of limit orders consisting of order 






















Panel A: Institutional Orders
Depth_Same -0.160 85.2% 7.4% -0.103 68.0% 24.0% -0.070 57.1% 35.7%
Depth_Opp 0.196 3.7% 92.6% 0.099 8.0% 80.0% -0.023 53.6% 35.7%
Spread 0.750 0.0% 100.0% 1.224 0.0% 100.0% 0.753 10.7% 82.1%
Volatility -0.647 77.8% 11.1% -0.549 68.0% 20.0% -0.561 71.4% 10.7%
Order_Size -0.002 48.1% 48.1% -0.007 64.0% 32.0% 0.021 14.3% 64.3%
Sell_Order -0.010 55.6% 33.3% -0.043 56.0% 36.0% 0.005 46.4% 42.9%
RBA_1M 0.096 0.0% 77.8% 0.019 12.0% 38.0% 0.059 7.1% 35.0%
RBA_Expected -0.016 40.7% 40.7% 0.007 48.0% 44.0% -1.208 35.7% 39.3%
RBA_Surprise 0.230 11.1% 81.5% 0.370 8.0% 88.0% 0.713 10.7% 71.4%
Panel B: Retail Orders
Depth_Same -0.127 59.3% 33.3% -0.093 44.0% 44.0% -0.092 39.3% 25.0%
Depth_Opp 0.174 7.4% 74.1% 0.078 32.0% 60.0% -0.156 60.7% 28.6%
Spread 0.464 3.7% 92.6% 0.759 8.0% 80.0% 0.470 39.3% 46.4%
Volatility -0.117 59.3% 18.5% -0.191 52.0% 32.0% -1.560 64.3% 17.9%
Order_Size 0.042 11.1% 81.5% 0.057 4.0% 80.0% 0.008 42.9% 39.3%
Sell_Order -0.002 51.9% 29.6% -0.024 56.0% 36.0% 0.062 28.6% 39.3%
RBA_1M -0.028 42.2% 18.5% -0.016 12.0% 4.0% 0.500 14.3% 14.3%
RBA_Expected 0.132 25.9% 63.0% -0.035 28.0% 48.0% -1.061 46.4% 14.3%
RBA_Surprise 0.923 3.7% 92.6% 0.849 0.0% 92.0% 1.033 3.6% 64.3%
Large-Cap Mid-Cap Small-Cap
This table presents results for the ordered probit analysis of the determinants of order aggression for instituional and retail brokers on days with RBA
target rate announcements. The estimated ordered probit model is: Z k = β 1 Depth_Same k + β 2 Depth_Opp k + β 3 Spread k + β 4 Volatility k +
β 5 Order_Size k + β 6 Sell_Order k + β 7 RBA_1M k + β 8 RBA_Expected k + β 9 RBA_Surprise k + ε k , where Z k is the latent order aggressiveness. A
number of market variables are included: Depth_Same k is the natural logarithm of the same-side market depth, Depth_Opp k is the natural logarithm
of the opposite-side market depth, Spread k is the relative spread at the time of the order submission, Volatility k is the standard deviation of mid-quote
returns for the 20 quotes proceeding the order, Order_Size k is the natural logarithm of the number of shares in the order, Sell_Order k is a dummy
variable indicating whether the order is a sell order (1) or not (0). A number of variables relating to the RBA announcement are also included:
RBA_1M k is a dummy variable indicating whether the order is placed within the first minute immediately following the RBA decision (1) or not (0),
RBA_Expected k indicates the market expectations on the RBA targer rate decision, and RBA_Surprise k indicates the level of the target rate surprise
(taking a value of 0 prior to the announcement time). Robust errors are used. Large-Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX50, Mid-Cap firms are
members of the S&P/ASX100 but not the S&P/ASX50, Small-Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX200 but not the S&P/ASX100. -ve and significant
represents the proportion of firms with a coefficient that is significantly less than zero at the 1% level, where the total number of firms in each size
category is 30. Likewise, +ve and significant  is the proportion of firms with a coefficient that is significantly greater than zero at the 1% level.
The sample period includes all regular trading hours on days with RBA monetary policy announcements that occur during the period 05 December 
2007 - 02 December 2014.
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Panel A: Institutional Buy Orders
Depth_Same -0.125 77.8% 11.1% -0.047 52.0% 36.0% -0.080 60.7% 25.0%
Depth_Opp 0.151 7.4% 77.8% 0.088 16.0% 72.0% -0.063 60.7% 32.1%
Spread 0.783 3.7% 88.9% 1.498 4.0% 96.0% 0.690 21.4% 67.9%
Volatility -1.132 63.0% 18.5% -0.319 52.0% 32.0% -0.648 71.4% 17.9%
Order_Size -0.006 59.3% 37.0% -0.005 64.0% 28.0% 0.027 25.0% 64.3%
RBA_1M 0.098 7.4% 74.1% 0.047 12.0% 52.0% 0.073 7.1% 21.4%
RBA_Expected 0.055 33.3% 51.9% 0.052 28.0% 64.0% 0.386 25.0% 50.0%
RBA_Surprise 0.271 14.8% 70.4% 0.537 12.0% 88.0% 0.661 17.9% 64.3%
Panel B: Institutional Sell Orders
Depth_Same -0.194 85.2% 7.4% -0.103 68.0% 20.0% -0.106 60.7% 39.3%
Depth_Opp 0.243 3.7% 88.9% 0.067 12.0% 72.0% -0.006 42.9% 50.0%
Spread 0.674 7.4% 88.9% 0.924 28.0% 72.0% 0.746 32.1% 64.3%
Volatility -0.194 66.7% 25.9% -0.691 68.0% 24.0% -0.725 60.7% 32.1%
Order_Size -0.001 37.0% 51.9% -0.008 60.0% 36.0% 0.037 28.6% 60.7%
RBA_1M 0.094 3.7% 63.0% 0.000 12.0% 16.0% 0.047 21.4% 25.0%
RBA_Expected -0.090 63.0% 29.6% -0.083 56.0% 28.0% -0.278 60.7% 21.4%
RBA_Surprise 0.196 25.9% 63.0% 0.233 24.0% 68.0% 0.739 7.1% 78.6%
Panel C: Retail Buy Orders
Depth_Same -0.119 55.6% 40.7% -0.007 36.0% 40.0% -0.156 46.4% 28.6%
Depth_Opp 0.181 11.1% 74.1% 0.091 32.0% 68.0% -0.134 57.1% 25.0%
Spread 0.699 7.4% 77.8% 1.020 4.0% 76.0% 0.322 42.9% 39.3%
Volatility -0.059 55.6% 18.5% -0.892 48.0% 20.0% -0.511 60.7% 21.4%
Order_Size 0.040 11.1% 81.5% 0.043 8.0% 76.0% 0.012 46.4% 35.7%
RBA_1M 0.048 7.4% 29.6% 0.062 4.0% 24.0% 0.469 17.9% 10.7%
RBA_Expected 0.251 18.5% 70.4% 0.102 20.0% 64.0% 1.255 25.0% 32.1%
RBA_Surprise 1.130 3.7% 92.6% 0.953 0.0% 88.0% 0.675 7.1% 57.1%
Panel D: Retail Sell Orders
Depth_Same -0.065 40.7% 40.7% -0.172 52.0% 36.0% -0.041 46.4% 25.0%
Depth_Opp 0.090 18.5% 55.6% 0.072 28.0% 44.0% -0.164 50.0% 21.4%
Spread 0.363 18.5% 77.8% 0.380 32.0% 56.0% 0.469 46.4% 28.6%
Volatility -0.017 63.0% 18.5% -1.121 56.0% 24.0% -1.507 46.4% 25.0%
Order_Size 0.043 18.5% 59.3% 0.065 4.0% 72.0% -0.010 39.3% 32.1%
RBA_1M -0.110 44.4% 3.7% -0.051 20.0% 4.0% 1.545 17.9% 21.4%
RBA_Expected -0.001 35.9% 29.6% -0.277 44.0% 28.0% -1.659 35.7% 0.0%
RBA_Surprise 0.749 3.7% 85.2% 0.606 8.0% 56.0% 1.451 0.0% 50.0%
This table presents results for the ordered probit analysis of the determinants of the order aggression of the buy and sell orders of institutional 
and retail brokers on days with RBA target rate announcements. The estimated ordered probit model is: Z k = β 1 Depth_Same k +
β 2 Depth_Opp k + β 3 Spread k + β 4 Volatility k + β 5 Order_Size k + β 6 RBA_1M k + β 7 RBA_Expected k + β 8 RBA_Surprise k + ε k , where Z k 
is the latent order aggressiveness. A number of market variables are included: Depth_Same k is the natural logarithm of the same-side market
depth, Depth_Opp k is the natural logarithm of the opposite-side market depth, Spread k is the relative spread at the time of the order
submission, Volatility k is the standard deviation of mid-quote returns for the 20 quotes proceeding the order, Order_Size k is the natural
logarithm of the number of shares in the order. A number of variables relating to the RBA announcement are also included: RBA_1M k is a
dummy variable indicating whether the order is placed within the first minute immediately following the RBA decision (1) or not (0),
RBA_Expected k indicates the market expectations on the RBA targer rate decision, and RBA_Surprise k indicates the level of the target rate
surprise (taking a value of 0 prior to the announcement time). Robust errors are used. Large-Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX50, Mid-
Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX100 but not the S&P/ASX50, Small-Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX200 but not the
S&P/ASX100. -ve and significant represents the proportion of firms with a coefficient that is significantly less than zero at the 1% level, where
the total number of firms in each size category is 30. Likewise, +ve and significant is the proportion of firms with a coefficient that is
significantly greater than zero at the 1% level.
Large-Cap Mid-Cap Small-Cap
The sample period includes all regular trading hours on days with RBA monetary policy announcements that occur during the period 05 
December 2007 - 02 December 2014.
Table	9
The price impact of retail broker trades
Interval |Mean Return (%)| N



































The sample period includes the RBA announcement days that occur during the period 05 
December 2007 - 02 December 2014. 
This table presents results for the price impact  of trades initiated by retail brokers in the 
immediate aftermath of RBA announcements (measured as absolute returns following trade 
initation) . The period of returns is measured in seconds following the announcement. Trades in 
Group 1  are those initiated by a retail broker with an insitutional broker as counterparty. Trades 
in Group 2 are those initiated by a retail broker with a non-instituional broker as a counterparty. 
Large-Cap  firms are members of the S&P/ASX50, Mid-Cap  firms are members of the 
S&P/ASX100 but not the S&P/ASX50, Small-Cap firms are members of the S&P/ASX200 but not 
the S&P/ASX100. Absolute returns are calculated using the quote mid-point at the end of the 
relevant time interval.
Group 1
Group 2
